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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
statement of its witness, the trial court would dismiss the action;
under the act the trial court may either strike the testimony of
that witness or, if the interests of justice require it, declare a
mistrial.29
Thus the instant case and the ensuing act appear to have
settled the clash between the interests of privilege and produc-
tion. The defendant in a federal criminal case may, by demand-
ing specific documents, compel production of prior statements
touching the testimony of a government witness who has testi-
fied, 0 and the trial judge will determine relevancy of these state-
ments in chambers.81 However, should the government elect to
claim its privilege and withhold the documents, the witness' testi-
mony will be stricken or a mistrial declared. 2
Jerre Lloyd
EVIDENCE - PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS- RIGHT OF ACCUSED
TO INSPECT PRIOR STATEMENTS OF STATE WITNESSES
Defendant was convicted of rape. At the trial the prosecutrix
stated during cross examination that she had made a written
statement to the police just after the alleged offense. Defendant
moved for production of the statement by the prosecution for
possible use in impeaching the prosecutrix. 1 The district attor-
ney offered to produce the statement voluntarily if defendant
would read all of it to the jury, but defendant refused this con-
ditional offer. The trial court then declined to compel produc-
tion, and the Louisiana Supreme Court held, affirmed. Defend-
ant had not laid the foundation necessary for production by
showing either that production of the prior statement was
"essential" to defendant or "was contrary in any respect" to the
prosecutrix's testimony. State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 95 So.2d
305 (1957).
29. 71 STAT. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. 1957).
30. Jeneks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). However, defendant cannot
utilize this procedure prior to trial to obtain statements of a prospective govern-
ment witness. United States v. Benson, 20 F.R.D. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
31. 71 STAT. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. 1957).
32. Ibid.
1. The credibility of a witness may be impeached by showing that the witness
has made a prior statement which contradicts his testimony, provided a founda-
tion is laid by calling the attention of the witness to the circumstances in which
the prior statement was made. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950). If the prior statement
is introduced, it does not serve to prove the truth of what it says, but is admitted
solely to neutralize the testimony of the witness. E.g., State v. Bodoin, 153 La.
641, 96 So. 501 (1923).
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Many jurisdictions have been reluctant to allow the defend-
ant in a criminal case the right to pre-trial discovery2 or produc-
tion at the trial3 of documents in the possession of the prose-
cution. Indeed, Louisiana permits the defendant pre-trial dis-
covery only of his written confession, and denies him discovery
of written confessions of co-defendants, police reports in the
hands of the sheriff, police department, or district attorney, and
written statements of witnesses.4 The courts are reluctant to
allow a defendant to engage in a "fishing expedition" into the
prosecution's file in the hope that something of value may turn
up.5 Yet when defendant seeks, during trial, to compel produc-
tion by the prosecution of a prior statement by a state witness
which may be contradictory to the witness' testimony and hence
relevant for impeachment purposes, the demand may be specific
enough to separate it from the "fishing expedition" category.
In an early Louisiana case, State v. Guagliardo, it was clear
from the evidence that the prior statement sought by defendant
would probably contradict the testimony of the state witness,
and the court held that the prosecution should have been com-
pelled to produce it.0 Although this decision can be harmonized
with other early cases, it was never mentioned by any of them.
In State v. SimonT the court indicated that something more than
defendant's mere allegation that the prior statement would be
relevant for impeachment purposes was needed, and suggested
that a possible foundation for production might be an affidavit
or affirmation under oath by defense counsel that the statement
contradicted the witness' testimony.8 The court added that it
was not prejudicial error to deny defense counsel the inspection
of a prior statement if, as a practical matter, he could not use it
to impeach the witness due to his failure to lay the proper
2. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1859g (3d ed. 1940).
3. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2444. See also Annot., 52 A.L.R. 207 (1928).
4. State v. Shourds, 224 La. 955, 71 So.2d 340 (1954) ; State v. Haddad, 221
La. 337, 59 So.2d 411 (1952) ; State v. Martinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So.2d 888
(1952) ; State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So.2d 585 (1949); State v. Mattio,
212 La. 284, 31 So.2d 801 (1947) ; State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273
(1945).
La5. State v. Lee, 173 La. 966, 139 So. 302 (1932) ; State v. Bankston, 165
La. 1082, 116 So. 565 (1928) ; State v. Simon, 131 La. 520, 59 So. 975 (1912).
6. 146 La. 949, 84 So. 216 (1920).
7. 131 La. 520, 59 So. 975 (1912).
8. The court was evidently grappling with the essential problem of determining
defendant's need for the statement as a justification for compelling production.
Yet requiring an oath that the prior statement contradicts the testimony would




foundation for such a use. However, in State v. Bankston9 the
court held there would be no error in denying production if the
foundation for impeachment had not been laid. Although the
court was understandably reluctant to allow production when
defendant could not use the statement, it seemed to confuse
the foundation necessary for production with that required for
introduction of the statement into evidence for impeachment.
Furthermore, the Bankston decision forecast the tone of the
cases that were to follow, when the court complained that de-
fendant had not even stated his purpose in demanding produc-
tion. The same complaint was made in a later case. 10 This con-
tinual failure of the defendant to present any practical reasons
for compulsory production evidently caused the court in the
later decisions to neglect the problem of the proper foundation,
and the cases denied production in strict terms, rejecting de-
fendant's argument that prior statements were public records.""
In the last case prior to the instant one defendant's counsel did
inform the court that he wanted the prior statement for im-
peachment purposes, but the court followed the pattern of the
later decisions and denied production.U
The meaning of the instant case in terms of its effect on
prior jurisprudence is not entirely clear. It is certain that the
court rejected as being too strict the blanket denial of produc-
tion observed in the later decisions.'3 However, it is difficult to
determine exactly what is required in order to compel produc-
tion. In one place the opinion states that production could be
compelled "in instances where a proper foundation for the im-
peachment of the witness has been laid."'14 (Emphasis added.)
Taken literally, this language would indicate a confusion of the
foundation required for introduction of the statement into evi-
dence with that necessary to compel production of the statement
9. 165 La. 1082, 116 So. 565 (1928).
10. State v. Lee, 173 La. 966, 139 So. 302 (1932).
11. State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So.2d 411 (1952) (court seemed puzzled
that defendant should even ask for production) ; State v. Williams, 216 La. 419,
43 So.2d 780 (1949) ; State v. Vallery, 214 La. 495, 38 So.2d 148 (1948) ; State
v. Dallao, 187 La. 392, 175 So. 4 (1937) (semble) (apparent extension of denial
of pre-trial inspection to inspection during trial).
12. State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So.2d 333 (1954).
13. In a review of most of the jurisprudence the court stated that the later
cases denying production had impliedly overruled the earlier ones allowing it, in-
cluding State v. Hodgeson, 130 La. 382, 58 So. 14 (1912). The Hodgeson case,
however, held that defendant could use a subpoena duces tecum to compel pro-
duction of a prior statement in the hands of a third person. Since the later eases
dealt with production by the state, it would seem that they could not have im-
pliedly overruled the Hodgeson case.
14. State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 780, 95 So.2d 305, 310 (1957).
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for inspection by the defense. A more reasonable interpretation
of the holding would be to give full force to a statement in the
opinion indicating two methods of laying a foundation for pro-
duction: first, when "circumstances" exist which would indicate
that production is "essential" to the defendant; second, when
defendant shows the prior statement to be "contrary in any
respect" to the witness' testimony. 15 The first instance would
include the situation presented in the Guagliardo case, in which
it was obvious from the evidence that the prior statement would
be valuable for impeachment. 16 Thus the substance of the Guag-
liardo holding is preserved in the instant case, although the
court did not mention that case in its opinion. The second situa-
tion presents difficulty. The court suggests that an admission
of inconsistency on the stand would be sufficient.1" However,
since in Louisiana it seems that a prior statement cannot be
introduced into evidence for the purpose of impeachment once
the witness has admitted the statement was made,18 the act of
laying a sufficient foundation would render the statement use-
less as evidence. Certainly it may be concluded that the instant
case represents a retreat from the rigidity of the later decisions,
but what foundation is necessary in order to compel production
remains unclear. It is well to note that in support of its deci-
sion the court cited the United States Supreme Court case of
Gordon v. United States, 9 which most federal courts had inter-
preted as requiring a foundation of inconsistency for produc-
tion.2 0 Yet three months after the instant case was decided the
United States Supreme Court, in Jeneks v. United States, held
15. Id. at 780, 95 So.2d at 310.
16. See State v. Guagliardo, 146 La. 949, 84 So. 216 (1920).
17. State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 780, 95 So.2d 305, 310 (1957).
18. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950) (by implication) ; State v. Folden, 135 La. 791,
66 So. 223 (1914) ; State v. Goodbier, 48 La. Ann. 770, 19 So. 755 (1896).
Under the federal system the fact that the witness admits making a prior
statement inconsistent with his testimony does not preclude the introduction of
the statement into evidence. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953);
United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944). It is interesting to
note that this rule was announced simply to overcome the impasse created by
allowing production if the witness admitted making an inconsistent statement
while at the same time disallowing use of the statement upon such an admission.
Ibid.
19. 344 U.S. 414 (1953).
20. United States v. Bookie, 229 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1956) ; United States V.
Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382
(1st Cir. 1955) ; Simmons v. United States, 220 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953).
Whether this was a correct interpretation of the Gordon decision is at least




that the Gordon case had not required such a foundation. 21 The
federal rule now is that the defendant may compel production
merely by making his demand for specific documents containing
prior statements which touch the testimony of the government
witness. 22 It is interesting to speculate as to whether the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court will further liberalize its views as a result
of the Jencks decision.
Jerre Lloyd
MINERAL RIGHTS - BREACH OF CONTRACT - DAMAGES
Plaintiff landowners executed a mineral lease with defend-
ant's assignors. The lease contained a clause obligating the lessee
to drill offset wells if such were necessary,' and also provided
that the lessor had to put the lessee in default for any alleged
breach of any express or implied obligation of the lease.2 If the
lessee, within sixty days of notice, proceeded to meet the alleged
breaches, he was not to be considered in default. Defendant
drilled a well on the leased tract, completing it in the "D" sand,
the lowest of three productive sands. Subsequently, six wells
were drilled by defendant on surrounding tracts. As a conse-
quence of a geological survey conducted by plaintiffs, it was dis-
closed that one of the adjoining wells was within 660 feet of the
leased tract,8 that the surrounding wells were producing from
the "C" sand which underlay plaintiffs' tract, and that they
were draining minerals underlying the leased tract. Plaintiffs
gave notice of breach, demanding that defendant take steps to
prevent drainage from the "C" sand beneath the leased tract.
Within forty-two days defendant had recompleted the well on
the leased tract in the "C" sand. In a suit to recover damages
for failure to drill an offset well and for drainage from beneath
21. 353 U.S. 657 (1957), noted page 345 supra.
22. Ibid.
1. "In the event a well or wells producing oil in paying quantities should be
brought in on adjacent lands not owned by the Lessor and within six hundred
sixty (660) feet of said land, Lessee agrees to drill such offset wells as a reason-
ably prudent operator would drill under the same or similar circumstances."
2. "In the event Lessor considers that Lessee has not complied with all its
obligations hereunder, both express and implied, Lessor shall notify Lessee in
writing, setting out specifically in what respects Lessee has breached this contract.
If within sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice, Lessee shall meet or com-
mence to meet the breaches alleged by Lessor Lessee shall not be deemed in default
hereunder. The service of said notice and the lapse of sixty (60) days without
Lessee meeting or commencing to meet the alleged breaches shall be deemed an
admission or presumption that Lessee has failed to perform all its obligations
hereunder."
3. See note 1 supra.
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